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‘If one wants to write an anthropology of Islam one should begin, as
Muslims do, from the concept of a discursive tradition that includes and
relates itself to the founding texts of the Qur8:n and the Hadith. Islam is
neither a distinctive social structure nor a heterogeneous collection of
beliefs, artifacts, customs, and morals. It is a tradition.’1 Thus Talal
Asad, the preeminent anthropologist of secularism, stated over two
decades ago in his influential discussion of the ‘Idea of an Anthropology
of Islam’. In spite of Asad’s articulate critique of both the classical
anthropological and Orientalist framing of Islam as an object of inquiry,
his recommendations can hardly be said to have become normative
among scholars of Islamic life-worlds, particularly in the present.
Our current distance from Asad’s ideal may have to do with the
difficulty of fulfilling the imperative he sets for students of that segment
of contemporary societies which either defines itself, or may reasonably
be defined as, Islamic: to begin with, the foundational texts within this
tradition. For most working within this field, the Qur8:n and Aadı¯th are
likely to be the last rather than first set of conceptual resources they draw
on in formulating the results of their research for Anglophone audiences.
Another deeper complication entailed by Asad’s prescription is its
implicit advocacy of religion as a category that should motivate, rather
than constrain, intellectual inquiry. Asad instructs us to begin with
precepts that are in most social science contexts relegated to contextual
background. Such an injunction poses a challenge in a secular age when
reigning discourses contrast religion to reason, and regard belief as the
incomplete representation of reality. It is certainly no accident that major
1 Talal Asad, The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam (Washington, DC: Center
for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1986). Rather than
marking a full break with the Orientalist tradition, Asad’s anthropology of Islam
builds on the Orientalist precedent of privileging the text as an axis of inquiry; an
arguable distinction between these two approaches is that Asad proposes to
subject the texts of European civilization to the same scrutiny that he subjects
Islamic texts.
 The Author (2011). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Oxford Centre for Islamic
Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
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critiques of secular knowledge in modernity have been issued almost
unilaterally by those engaged with the Islamic world,2 for, unlike modern
Christianity, Islam seems to pose the deepest challenge to secularizing
points of view. The present essay probes these dichotomies—between
religion and the secular on the one hand and Islam and Christianity on
the other—on the basis of fieldwork among the Chechen Kists of
Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge, one of the oldest and largest Muslim
communities in the Republic of Georgia.3 Until the influx of Chechen
refugees from across the Caucasus mountains during the Russo-
Caucasian wars (1825–64), the Pankisi Gorge was largely Christian,
though, from the sixteenth century onwards, populated more by
Tushetians (known in the non-Georgian vernacular as Batsbi) with
close ties to Muslim Chechens than by ethnic Georgians. At present, the
Gorge is primarily inhabited by Muslim descendants of the Chechens
who call themselves Kists and live on neighbourly terms with a sizeable
minority of Georgian Christians.4 While many Kists subscribe to various
secularisms that became normative in Soviet times, religious faith persists
into the present, and at an unprecedented level.
In addition to decentring the commonly critiqued relation between
European knowledge and the non-European subject, a renewed focus on
the Islamic tradition (including by scholars who do not define themselves
as Islamic) provides richer conceptual foundations for understanding our
object of inquiry as compared to more familiar resources grounded in
2 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Gil Anidjar, ‘Secularism’, Critical
Inquiry 33/1 (2006): 52–77; Saba Mahmood, ‘Religious Reason and Secular
Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?’, Critical Inquiry, 35/4 (2009): 836–62.
Asad, Anidjar, and Mahmood primarily focus on the impact of secularism on
European perceptions of Islam.
3 Other Muslim communities in Georgia include the Azeris centred in
Marabdeli and the Daghestanis centred in the region called Satslis Xure (Sow’s
Ear), both in the northeasterly region of Kaxeti. The Azeris are more numerous
than the Kists of Pankisi, but they have assimilated more fully into Georgian
society than have the Kists.
4 The dense and entangled history of Muslim and Christian settlements in the
Pankisi Gorge is surveyed in Mat’e Albut’ashvili, Pankisis xeoba, (ed. G. and
N. Javaxishvili; T’bilisi: K’art’ul kavkaziuri urt’iert’obis tsentri, 2005 [1898]);
Rebecca Gould, ‘Language Dreamers: Race and the Politics of Etymology in the
Caucasus’ in Bruce Grant and Lale Yalc¸|n-Heckmann (eds.), Caucasus
Paradigms: Anthropologies, Histories, and the Making of a World Area
(Berlin: LIT, 2007), 143–66. Worth mentioning, though more political in
focus, is Johannes Rau, Russland, Georgien, Tschetschenien: der Konflikt um das
Pankisi-Tal (1997–2003): ein Handbuch (Berlin: Ko¨ster, 2005).
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liberal imaginaries, and better enables us to grasp the processes of change
occurring within Islamic societies today. Noting the conceptual failings
of ‘a focus purely on ‘‘belief’’ and doctrines [. . .] with regard to the
richness and complexity of religious life’, Deweese has drawn attention
to the imperative that scholars of Islamic societies move beyond the
liberal binary of belief versus doubt and embrace a more richly grounded
understanding of the many varieties of Islam that inform a Muslim’s
daily life.5 Although the tension between textuality and daily life is
arguably intrinsic to the fieldwork scenario itself, examining contem-
porary Islamic societies from perspectives internal to the Islamic
tradition helps us not only to view these societies differently, but to
view modern European norms through illuminating, if unfamiliar, lenses.
Here I propose, on the basis of fieldwork in Pankisi conducted over the
course of two years, to examine the contribution that specific modalities
of Islamic belief and worship may make to our understandings of the
meanings and paradoxes attending the multivalent calls for secularism
across the globe. My ethnography is organized according to two aspects
of Pankisi’s landscape that have undergone transformations in the
past decade: minarets and headstones. These two aesthetic dimensions in
turn yield understanding of the role played by public worship and
mourning in mediating social life in Pankisi. In addition to their
importance as regulatory structures for daily life, they also reveal
Pankisi’s complex interaction with what we have come to call modernity
and specifically with the elements of belief and doubt that enter into this
experience.
Minarets first became a staple of the Islamic architecture during the
Umayyad period (661–750), when the caliph al-Walı¯d (r. 705–715)
adapted a Christian church in Damascus into an Islamic mosque.6 This
long history of interchange between Islamic, Jewish, and Christian, and
prior to that, Zoroastrian and Mesopotamian, modes of worship, has
largely been forgotten in recent centuries, to the extent that the minaret
has become, according to one recent articulation, an exclusively Islamic
‘symbol of political-societal power claim of Islam’, with such capacity to
arouse fear in non-Muslims that the citizens of Switzerland recently
approved an amendment to their constitution prohibiting the building of
5 Devin DeWeese, ‘Islam and the Legacy of Sovietology: A Review Essay of
Yaacov Ro’i’s Islam in the Soviet Union’, Journal of Islamic Studies, 13/3 (2002):
298–330, at 303.
6 Richard J. H. Gottheil, ‘Origin and History of the Minaret’, Journal of the
American Oriental Society, 30/2 (1910): 132–54, at 138; Robert Hillenbrand,
EI2 art., ‘Man:ra, Man:r’, vi. 361–9.
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future minarets.7 Nor is it accidental that the first Islamic journal to
propagate the post-madhhab (la-madhhabiyya, ‘without schools of law’)
orientation of modernist Islam was called al-Man:r. Founded by the
reformer MuAammad 6Abduh in 1897 and later edited by 6Abduh’s
student Rashı¯d Ri@a until 1935, the journal was a major channel for the
dissemination of ideas that are currently called Salafi.8
The recent law is the first such initiative in Europe since 1893 to isolate
a single community for discrimination in an official—constitutional, and
we might add, democratically constitutional—context. The 1893 initia-
tive led to a law, still in effect, prohibiting kosher animal slaughter,
intended to discourage immigration to Switzerland by Jews escaping the
pogroms of Tsarist Russia.9 But it is not only in Switzerland that
minarets have stirred controversy. Among Muslims living on Islamic
peripheries, the minaret has come to represent more than itself; whether
in austerity or luxury, it is understood to contain a prophecy about the
place of Islam in the future commonwealth of nations.
Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge was, until two decades ago, inhabited
exclusively by Chechen-speaking Kists who had assimilated to
Georgian ways by learning the Georgian language, adopting Georgia’s
history as part of their own sub-national narrative, and in all substantive
ways—with the crucial exception of religion—becoming Georgian. A
decade of war-time migration by Chechen refugees from across the
mountainous border to the north has transformed the character of
Pankisi’s Islam. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
Islamic practice in Pankisi was marked by a steady convergence with
Georgian–Christian styles of worship, even as the region itself was
7 Mark LeVine, ‘In Fear of ‘‘Eurabia’’?’, Al Jazeera (3 December 2011), http://
english.aljazeera.net/focus/2009/12/20091229223658221.html [accessed 6 June
2011]. For a scholarly study of the validity of the minaret ban (written prior to
the passage of the Swiss initiative), see Marcel Stu¨ssi, ‘Banning of Minarets:
Addressing the Validity of a Controversial Swiss Popular Initiative’, Religion and
Human Rights, 3 (Brill, 2008): 135–53.
8 On the contribution of journals such as al-Man:r to Islamic modernism, see
Stephen Sheehi, ‘Arabic Literary-Scientific Journals: Precedence for Globalization
and the Creation of Modernity’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and
the Middle East 25/2 (2005): 438–49.
9 Tariq Ramadan, ‘My compatriots’ vote to ban minarets is fueled by fear’,
Guardian (29 November 2009), www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/
2009/nov/29/swis-vote-ban-minarets-fear; Shlomo Avineri, ‘What do mosque
minarets and kosher slaughter have in common?’ Haaretz (6 December 2009),
www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/what-do-mosque-minarets-and-kosher-
slaughter-have-in-common-1.2720.
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marked by a symbiosis of these two traditions, as evidenced by the
Church of St. Giorgi that stands in Joqolo, not far from the village of
Duisi, where Pankisi’s first minaret stands (Figs. 1 and 2). Both structures
were built in the nineteenth century.
Subsequently, despite the indoctrination under Soviet rule into
state-enforced atheism, recent years have seen a return to Islam.
Although the Caucasus has been part of the Islamic world from the
earliest days of the Umayyad caliphate, when Arab warriors converted
Fig. 1: St. Giorgi Church in Pankisi Gorge, village of Joqolo, built 1887.
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the Sassanid outpost of Derbent (currently the largest city in southern
Daghestan, part of the Russian Federation) into an Umayyad fortress,
two centuries of Russian imperial and subsequently Soviet rule have done
Fig. 2: The first minaret in Pankisi, in the village of Duisi, ca. 19th c.10
10 Figs. 1 and 2, and 7 and 8 taken from Albut’ashvili, Pankisis xeoba, pp. 20,
28, 17, 19, respectively.
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much to obscure the deep Islamic pasts of this region.11 But, in Pankisi as
elsewhere, what has been lost at the level of public consciousness persists
in the realms of myth, storytelling, burial, marriage, and birth customs,
literature, folklore, and language.12 A survey of the history and
ethnography of Pankisi demonstrates the region’s startling capacity for
assimilation: of Chechen to Georgian, Islamic to Christian, and Sunni to
Shi6a. Recent decades have brought new influences and new strategies for
assimilation.
Among these forms is one commonly referred to in the Russian press,
everyday conversation, and in scholarship, under the moniker ‘Wahh:bı¯’,
a term that is especially inexact in view of the discontinuities between the
Wahhabi and Salafi movement on the one hand and the Salafi movement
and the new Pankisi Islam on the other.13 That the term Wahhabi rather
than Salafi is used pejoratively by scholars and by the local press to
describe revivalist Islam in the former Soviet Union indicates one of the
many displacements Muslims face in this world region.14 Though both
11 Daghestan represents something of an exception to this rule; see inter alia
Pis’mennye pamiatniki Dagestana XVIII-XIX vv.: sbornik statei (eds. Kh. A.
Omarov and A. R. Shikhsaidov; Makhachkala: Dagestanskii filial AN SSSR,
1989). Soviet scholarship foregrounded Islamic pasts when such foregrounding
was necessary to construct a pre-revolutionary Islamic other.
12 See Shorena Kurtsikidze and Vakhtang Chikovani, Ethnography and
Folklore of the Georgia–Chechnya Border: Images, Customs, Myths and Folk
Tales of the Peripheries (Munich: Lincom Europa, 2008), esp. 227–61; Xvt’iso
Mamisimedishvili, Pankisi: tsarsuli da t’anamedroveoba [Pankisi: past and
modernity] (T’bilisi: T’bilisis universitetis gamomtsemloba, 2008); Iu.
Shavxelishvili, Kul’turno-etnicheskie vzaimootnosheniia mezhdu Gruziei i
Checheno-Ingushetiei v XIX i nach. XX v. kisty Pankisi [Cultural and ethnic
relations between Georgia and Chechnya-Ingushetia among the Kists of Pankisi
from the beginning of the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries], (T’bilisi:
Metsniereba, 1990).
13 Two typical and symptomatic accounts are: A. A. Iarlykapov, Problema
vakhkhabizma na Severnom Kavkaze [The problem of Wahhabism in the North
Caucasus] (Moscow: RAN, 2000) and V. Kh. Akaev, Sufizm i vakhkhabizm na
severnom Kavkaze [Sufism and Wahhabism in the North Caucasus] (Moscow:
RAN, 1999). Also see the critical review of Kurtsikidze and Chikovani’s
Ethnography and Folklore of the Georgia–Chechnya Border by Paul Manning in
Anthropology of East Europe Review, 28/1 (2010): 414–18, which highlights the
impact of ‘global terror’ on local historiography.
14 The majority of scholarship on Islam in the Caucasus continues to be
written from a monolithically Russian perspective, or from a perspective
confined to a statist approach to the study of political life. Exceptions include
V. O. Bobrovnikov, Musulmane Severnogo Kavkaza: obychai, pravo, nasilie:
ocherki po istorii i e˙tnografii prava Nagornogo Daghestana [Muslims of the
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terms imperfectly encompass the variegated contemporary movements
under which they are bracketed, ‘Salafi’, which literally refers to the
forefathers (salaf al-B:liAı¯n) in the Islamic tradition, is employed here in
preference to ‘Wahhabi’, in part due to the latter’s narrow application
and clearer association with a particular form of state-affiliated Islam of
Saudi provenance.
Though they bear little relation to their Hanbali counterparts in Saudi
Arabia,15 practitioners of this new brand of Islam are widely regarded as
instigators of a form of religious piety never practised before in the
Caucasus, or at least not known since the days of Im:m Sh:mil (1797–
1871), the last ruler to unite the northern Caucasus, to whom Kists trace
their ancestors, under the banner of Islam, in the north Caucasus’ Third
Imamate (1825–49). The new Muslims are resented by the older
generation, raised on Soviet ideologies that propagated the falsity of
all religions, yet also conscious of the inadequacy of Soviet accounts of
the sacred. Before proceeding to explore a few reactions to the new Islam
in Pankisi and its complex ways of interacting with the forms of worship
and belief that preceded it, it will be useful to consider the historical
foundations of classical Wahhabism in relation to the classical Sufism of
the Caucasus in order to discern where they converge and diverge.
Wahhabism has been called the ‘single most arresting movement in the
Islamic world’ during the early modern period.16 Insofar as 6Abd
al-Wahh:b (1703–92) claimed to access truths that none of his teachers
had known, his teaching ‘represented a clear break with the immediate
past’.17 But like all breaks, and perhaps to an even greater extent than
North Caucasus: custom, law and violence: Sketches on the history and
ethnography of law in mountainous Daghestan] (Moscow: Vostochnaia lit.
RAN, 2002); and, most recently, Michael Kemper, Raoul Motika and Stefan
Reichmuth (eds.), Islamic Education in the Soviet Union and Its Successor States
(Routledge: London, 2009).
15 One difference between classical Wahhabism and the new Pankisi Islam is
suggested by their differing attitudes towards the building of minarets. Robert
Hillenbrand (‘Man:ra’) notes that the Wahhabis ‘avoid building minarets on the
grounds that they are ostentatious and unnecessary’, whereas the new Salafis of
Pankisi are known for their erection of minarets in regions which had never
before seen such structures.
16 Michael Cook, ‘On Islam and Comparative Intellectual History’,
International Institute for Asian Studies Newsletter, 43 (2007): 7–7. Also on
eighteenth-century Wahhabism, see Khaled El-Rouayheb, ‘Opening the Gate of
Verification: The Forgotten Arab-Islamic Florescence of the 17th Century’,
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 38/2 (2006): 263–81.
17 6Abd al-Wahh:b is reported to have said to his biographer and disciple, ‘Not
one among my teachers knew [what I learned]; if any of the scholars of the 6Ari@
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usual, this one relied on ancient precedents. Needless to say, it is
inadvisable to compare the intellectual revolution that was largely
textual, inaugurated by 6Abd al-Wahh:b, with a popular movement such
as one finds in Pankisi’s revivalist Islam. The basic sources of the
Wahhabi movement were not known directly to anyone I came across in
Pankisi. Had they been available, the texts would have had to surmount
forbidding linguistic barriers that have yet to be crossed. Kists read
Georgian, Chechen, and in some cases Russian; Arabic is not part of the
Pankisi curriculum.
The Wahhabi movement and the proponents of the new Pankisi Islam
share in common a reaction against past precedent, as well as to
transformations in their geopolitical situations. Whereas Wahhabism
provided the ‘banner under which a new state and a new order arose in
eastern Arabia’ and therefore contained a significance that was ‘not just
intellectual’ but was also ‘political and military’,18 Pankisi’s new Islam
has also emerged over the course of the past three decades in response to
political and war-induced change. The new movement in both situations
sought to impose on the fragmented religious identities created by Soviet
secular ideology a new ideational unity. Though there may be political
aspirations, as with the Wahhabi aspiration for greater political power at
the level of the nation-state, whatever latent desires exist in this direction
cannot be fulfilled under current conditions. Both the Wahhabi move-
ment and the new Pankisi Islam demonstrate that there is a relation
between religious orientation and political aspiration and that religion
serves as a source of meaning in times of crisis.
Like the Wahhabi movement, the new generation of Pankisi Muslim
Kists present their religiosity in terms that openly contest the life-ways of
their elders. One observer of the da6wa movement in contemporary
Egypt observed during her fieldwork that ‘age hierarchy is often reversed
when young du6:t invoke higher moral authority and greater Islamic
knowledge than their elders to criticize them for their lax religious
lifestyles’.19 Likewise, among the Pankisi Kists, the younger generation
influenced by Islam perceives itself to occupy a moral space superior to
[6Abd al-Wahh:b’s hometown] claims that he knew the meaning of ‘L: il:ha illa
All:h’, or the meaning of Islam, before this time, or maintains that any of his
teachers knew it, he lies, fabricates, leads people astray, and falsely praises
himself’, Ibn Ghannam, Raw@at al-afk:r, i. 189.12 (Bombay, 1337), cited in
Michael Cook ‘On the Origins of Wahh:bism’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic
Society, 3/2 (1992): 191–202, at 202.
18 Cook, ‘On Islam and Comparative Intellectual History’, 7.
19 Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: the Islamic Revival and the Feminist
Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 116 n. 57.
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elders who engage in practices prohibited by the Qur8:n. The new
Pankisi Islam also shared with Wahhabism a commitment to austere
forms of worship—as demonstrated by their distinctive minaret (Fig. 2),
built of grey stone and topped by a metallic roof—and opposition to
shirk, polytheism, or the wrongful association with others’ gods.20 In the
eighteenth-century Hijaz, as in twenty-first century Pankisi, and mid-
nineteenth-century Daghestan under Im:m Sh:mil’s Third Imamate
(1824–59), purity in religion requires the rejection of extraneous
traditions, accrued customs (6:d:t), and a return to the original ways
of the Islamic forefathers.21
One motivation for the eighteenth-century reaction against shirk in the
Hijaz was to advocate a turn to the roots of Islamic monotheism and a
rejection of taBawwuf (Sufism). For 6Abd al-Wahh:b, this ambition
developed after he received a dream. Roughly around the year 1745, he
is reported by his earliest biographer to have received a blessing (khayr)
from God that contained a teaching hitherto unknown to the Islamic
world: ‘I sought learning (talabtu al-6ilm)’, he recounted, ‘yet . . . I did not
know the meaning of [the first part of the shah:da] ‘‘there is no god but
God’’ [l: il:ha illa All:h], nor did I know the religion of Islam’.22 Prior to
his dream, 6Abd al-Wahh:b’s vision had been clouded by shirk, the
worship of saints (6awlı¯y:8), and a prevalence of pagan worship,
including domed tombs.23 For the new generation of Islamic monotheists
in Pankisi as for the Wahhabis and Salafis, rejection of shirk implies a
rejection of the customs of their elders, including especially drinking and
milder forms of gambling. The new generation of Pankisi Muslims dress
20 For a relevant discussion of shirk in the contemporary context, see Sayyid
Qu3b, Milestones (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1990), ch. 3. Salafi
arguments concerning shirk are often drawn from the Qur8:nic texts 34. 20–4,
35. 40, and 46. 4. For shirk in the context of classical Islam, see Muhammad
Ibrahim Surty, The Qur8anic Concept of al-Shirk (Polytheism) (London: Ta Ha
Publishers, 1990).
21 Two outstanding sources in the vast bibliography of scholarship on Sh:mil’s
imamate that implicitly invoke contemporary parallels with Pankisi are Michael
Kemper, Herrschaft, Recht und Islam in Daghestan von den Khanaten und
Gemeindebu¨nden zum Gihadstaat (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2005), esp. 317–404
and M. S. Gadzhiev, G. Sh. Kaymarazov and A. P. Shikhsaidov, Islam i
islamskaia kultura v Daghestane (Moscow: Vostochnaia Literatura, 2001).
22 Ibn Ghannam, Raw@a, i. 189.12; Cook, ‘Origins of Wahh:bism’, 202. On
the origins of the shah:da, see Arent Jan Wensinck, The Muslim Creed: its
Genesis and Historical Development (London: Frank Cass, 1965), 17ff.
23 Henri Laoust, Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Takı¯-d-Dı¯n
Ahmad b. Taimı¯ya: canoniste hanbalite, ne´ a` Harran en 661/1262, mort a` Damas
en 728/1328 (Cairo: l’Institut Franc¸ais d’Arche´ologie Orientale, 1939), 530.
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austerely, refrain from drinking and gambling, and spend their spare time
reading the Qur8:n.
Unlike the Wahhabis and Salafis, however, the rejection of shirk
among the new generation of Pankisi Muslims is crucially informed
by their engagement with taBawwuf. Given the long history of
Naqshbandiyya and Q:diriyya Sufism in the north Caucasus, no viable
religious movement can position itself in opposition to Sufi beliefs or
worship practices. The purist and anti-Sufistic movements that spread
through the Islamic heartland in the modern period had little impact on
the Caucasus. Even the most austere of north Caucasian Islamic leaders,
Im:m Sh:mil, fashioned himself as a Sufi and found inspiration in Sufi
teachings for his movement. There is no deep-rooted suspicion of Sufi
practices among contemporary Pankisi Muslims and no sense that Sufis
have diverged from the path of the Ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jam:6a, as one
finds elsewhere.
At the same time, north Caucasian Sufism is diverse and has been
made to serve political, as well as quietist ends.24 As in Algeria, Sufi
teachings have informed anti-colonial movements, although recent
scholarship has questioned the extent of Sufi involvement in militant
Algerian and Daghestani anti-colonial resistance.25 But even when
historians do not agree on the formative role played by Sufi Islam in the
anti-colonial movements of the nineteenth century, a striking difference
between these contexts and more temporally proximate ones cannot be
denied: neither in the Muslim Caucasus nor in colonial Algeria was there
a perceived conflict between Sufism and militant Islam. In his recent
overview of Islam in the former Soviet Union, Adeeb Khalid has written
that Sunni orthodoxy in Central Asia ‘rested on a synthesis of juridical
Islam with Sufism’ such that sharı¯6a and 3arı¯qa came to be seen as
complementary rather than competing sources of authority. The overlap
between these two Islamic traditions was so intense that ‘all ulama had
Sufi affiliations, and Sufism realigned itself to the norms of juridical
Islam. Networks of scholarly and Sufi activity were indistinguishable
from one another’.26 The Russian Islamist Bobrovnikov has sought to
24 The Q:diriyya 3arı¯qa has the deepest roots among the Vainakh (Chechens,
Kists, Ingush); the Naqshbandiyya 3arı¯qa has the deepest roots among
Daghestani Muslims.
25 Jean-Louis Triaud, La le´gende noire de la Sanuˆssiya: une confre´rie
musulmane sous le regard franc¸ais (1840–1930), (Paris: Maison des Sciences
de l’Homme, 1995) and Alexander Knysh, ‘Sufism as an Explanatory Paradigm’,
Die Welt des Islams, 42/2 (2002): 139–73.
26 Adeeb Khalid, Islam after Communism: Religion and Politics in Central
Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 31.
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capture this seeming paradox of multiple Islams coexisting with and
informing each other by coining the term ‘militant Sufism’ to describe the
historical legacy of the Naqshbandiyya 3arı¯qa in the northern
Caucasus.27
The Naqshbandiyya 3arı¯qa has been appropriated by north Caucasian
political leaders including Im:m Sh:mil and Najm al-Dı¯n al-Hutsı¯ (d.
1925). North Caucasian Sufi leaders committed to the strict application
of Qur8:nic principles and teachings derived from Aadı¯th worked within
norms they understood as Sufi. The relation between taBawwuf and
mainstream Islam within the new Pankisi Islam could not differ more
starkly from Salafi and Wahhabi attitudes, which have historically
regarded taBawwuf with derision. If north Caucasian Islam has tended to
engage deeply with Sufi 3ariq:t of varying persuasions, it does not follow
that Sufi Islam as it developed in the north Caucasus bears no relation to
the four-madhhab arrangement according to which Sunnism has
conventionally organized itself since the tenth century. It is perhaps not
coincidental that AAmad b. Eanbal (d. 855), the founder of the school of
law to which present-day Wahhabism is most indebted, advocated a
political theory that intersects closely with that of Kunta E:jjı¯ (d. 1862),
the bringer of Qadiri Sufism to the Caucasus.
Whereas Naqshbandi Sufism has traditionally enjoined active resist-
ance to unjust regimes, AAmad b. Eanbal prescribed the opposite
approach to dealing with political injustice: ‘The Friday worship, the
celebration of the legal feasts, and the pilgrimage [Aajj], are observed
with the authorities [sul3:n], even if they are not upright, just, and pious.
Taxes [Badaq:t] are paid to commanders [umar:8], whether they deal
justly or wickedly . . . Those to whom God had entrusted your affairs are
to be followed . . . and not opposed by your sword . . . to keep aloof in
civil war [fi3na] is an old custom whose observance is obligatory.’28
AAmad b. Eanbal’s political views merit consideration within the
framework of his scepticism towards the claims of human reason. These
views belong to any account of Qadiri Sufism’s intellectual foundations,
for the founder of this branch in the twelfth century was a Eanbali
named 6Abd al-Q:dir al-Jı¯l:nı¯ (d. 1167).29
27 V. O. Bobrovnikov, ‘Al-Azhar and Shari6a Courts in Twentieth-century
Caucasus’, Middle Eastern Studies, 37/4 (2001): 1–24, at 2.
28 Ibn Abı¯ Ya6l:, Fabaq:t al-Ean:bila (ed. MuAammad Eamı¯d al-Fiqı¯; Cairo:
Ma3ba6at al-Sunna al-MuAammadiyya, 2 vols., 1371/1952), excerpted from i.
24–31. Emphasis added.
29 On Ibn Eanbal’s mystical tendencies and suspicion of reason, see
Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
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From this perspective, it is hardly surprising to encounter a Chechen
disciple of Kunta E:jjı¯, the bringer of Q:diriyya Sufism to the Caucasus
from Baghdad, express a political theology that (echoing AAmad b.
Eanbal’s critique) criticized the excessively militant Naqshbandiyya
Sufism active under Im:m Sh:mil’s imamate. Drawing on the common-
place opposition between duny: and :khira, the goods of this world and
the goods of the afterlife, Kunta E:jjı¯ rejects the ways of the murı¯ds, the
followers of Im:m Sh:mil, in the conviction that the holy person does
not rebel against an unjust regime, including Russian colonialism: ‘Some
have chosen the benefits of duny:, others have chosen :khira, and others
did not make a choice . . . [God said] ‘‘I promise to divide you into two
groups: one group will be guides in duny: and others will be leaders in
:khira . . . The first of the two groups are the murı¯ds . . . [who] will not be
directed to the happiness of :khira. Those who have chosen the benefits
of duny: will not find happiness in :khira.’’ ’30 If Kunta Eajjı¯’s Qadiri
quietism has deep roots in the Islamic jurisprudential tradition, it follows
that the ‘new’ Pankisi Islam should not be understood purely as an errant
innovation. Caucasian Wahhabism can only be opposed to taBawwuf at
the cost of ignoring Islamic history.
The Wahhabi movement and the new Islam in Pankisi share in
common a return to a simple lifestyle and a monotheistic religious
orientation. Although they share important features, their common
foundations are hardly congruent with the assumption prevalent in
current scholarship of categorical isomorphism. As shown above, north
Caucasian Sufism is not necessarily pacifistic. Daghestani Sufism in
particular has stimulated anti-colonial resistance and is as if not more
influential politically than Kunta E:jjı¯’s quietism. At the same time, the
Q:diriyya tarı¯qa has provided the Kists with a powerful means for
keeping religion alive during times of Soviet-enforced official atheism.
The Naqshbandiyya and Q:diriyya represent two distinct paths for
actualizing Islam’s social imperatives and enable the north Caucasian
Muslims to accommodate even Wahhabism within their belief systems.
Through this accommodation, Wahhabism’s internal structure has
changed, resulting in a new merger, and a new Caucasian Islam. Let us
now proceed to explore some of the concrete modalities through which
Pankisi’s Islamic landscape is becoming localized.
University Press, 1962) 120, 130; Ahmet T. Karamustafa, Sufism: The Formative
Period (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 22.
30 Cited from the unpublished and untitled manuscript of 6Abd al-Sal:m, a
disciple of Kunta E:jjı¯, (i. xii) in Anna Zelkina, ‘Some Aspects of the Teaching of
Kunta Haˆjjıˆ: On the Basis of the Manuscript by 6Abd al-Salaˆm Written in 1862
ad’, Journal of the History of Sufism, 1/2 (2000): 483–508, at 492.
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PUBLIC WORSHIP
I had just arrived in Omalo, the northernmost village in the Gorge (see
map, Fig. 3), when a voice resounded from above, not far away, reciting
the Qur8:n through a forest of trees. It was a dark night. The week-long
power outage showed no signs of relenting. The absence of light made
the voice resound all the more strongly. ‘What is that?’ I asked my host
Rostom and his wife Mzia, though I could have answered myself: the call
to the maghrib prayer from the minaret not far away (Fig. 4).
Constructed in the image of Duisi’s minaret without the latter’s
colourful exterior which reminded all Duiselians of their Islamic identity,
it had been erected less than a year before. The instigators for this
building project were Chechen refugees resident in Pankisi since the
beginning of the Second Chechen War in 2000. The refugees had saved
money for the initiative until they found a sponsor who agreed to match
their funds. The minaret towered over every other structure in Omalo,
including the ancient towers distantly visible on the mountainous
horizon. Everyone in Omalo had an opinion to offer on the aesthetic
merits and demerits of the new minaret: some thought the concrete walls
an eyesore, others deemed the grey slabs sublime, others regarded it
simply as a curiosity. For all three constituencies, Omalo’s minaret had
Fig. 3: Map: Pankisi Gorge, showing paths from Duisi to Jokolo to Omalo.
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fast become a fixture of the Pankisi landscape they could never have
envisioned during the years of Soviet rule.
‘Ever since the refugees came five years ago, they started the adh:n
[call to prayer]’, Rostom explained. ‘It’s not a real voice, you know. They
recorded the prayer on tape, and now they broadcast it five times a day,
the fools.’
His wife contradicted him: ‘No, it’s a real person. The muezzin rises to
the top of the minaret five times a day. I’ve seen him with my own eyes.’
‘Not at all! They taped the prayer to a microphone and now they play
it and perform all day.’
The argument continued into the night, as there was no other way to
pass the time in the absence of electricity than by pushing this joke to the
limit. More was concealed in Rostom’s words than was evident to me
when I first heard them. His dismissal of the Islamic symbol of worship
resonated against the background of one of the best Soviet educations
available in his milieu, and decades of intellectual training in the virtues
of atheism and the irrelevance of belief. Rostom’s mockery was directed
Fig. 4: Newly-constructed minaret in Omalo.31
31 This photograph and those shown in Figs. 5, 6, and 9–14 were taken by the
author, during fieldwork in Pankisi from June 2005 to August 2006.
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not merely against the Chechen refugees’ non-secularity; more crucial
was his scepticism concerning the intellectual validity of belief.
A professor affiliated with the Arnold Chikobava Institute of Sciences
in the Georgian Academy of Sciences, Rostom was the most educated
Kist in his village, one of a handful of Kists from Pankisi to be granted
the degree doktor nauk, equivalent to the German Habilitation. He was
respected within and outside the Academy as a specialist on the famously
abstruse Chechen verb, and had recently published the first ever
Georgian–Chechen dictionary.32 Rostom was also distinguished among
Kist scholars for his humility. Rostom’s contempt for religion did not
conceal an unexpressed conviction in atheism’s superiority, nor was it an
unreflective prejudice derived from an elitist education. Like most secular
curriculums, the Soviet system had provided Rostom with no vocabulary
for describing religious experience; he had to rely on his own intellectual
resources. As a linguist, he was accustomed to view humanity through
the lens of science, and modern science, as he learned from the university,
could not accommodate unreasoning modes of worship. So the call to
prayer was an act of stupidity, and the desire to formalize ritual through
mechanical means was further evidence of the absurdity of religious
belief.
On another occasion, Rostom and I were headed home, when the dirt
road along which we were walking filled with the sound of chanting. The
sound streamed onto the street from the largest and best-maintained
house in Omalo, which fronted the road that ran through the Gorge. The
house’s exterior was newly whitewashed and the walls of the room
facing the street were made of tinted glass. Rostom was not pleased by
the chanting that reverberated from the walls, this time in Chechen,
unlike the mechanized recitative in Arabic that resounded from Omalo’s
minaret.
‘Why do they blast those speakers so loudly, for all of Omalo to hear?
Why can’t they let us worship our gods in private? Why do they try to
force their religion on us?’
I learned from further conversations with Rostom and his relatives
that the Pankisi landscape had been empty of minarets until the influx of
refugees, who brought with them the new Islam from Chechnya. (No one
mentioned Duisi’s minaret, built a century earlier.) And yet, if this was
Wahhabism, it was a Wahhabism radically unlike any known before.
This Wahhabism did not oppose itself to taBawwuf, but rather sought to
revive it in a space where religious worship had until recently been
32 Rostom P6areulizde, Nokhchiı˘ n-gu0rzhiı˘ n dosham; Chechnur-k’art’uli
lek’sikoni [Chechen–Georgian dictionary] (T’bilisi: Georgian Academy of
Sciences, 2003).
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forbidden. One of Rostom’s nephews had gone over to the side of the
‘new Islam’. In practice this meant that he was stricter than the rest of his
family in his dietary habits, refusing all forms of alcohol and tobacco,
fasted with precision on every holy day, prayed five times a day at a
minimum, and had a better, if still imperfect, knowledge of the Qur8:n.
The Christian churches from the past century were left standing and
treated as holy places even by the new Wahhabis, although, as during the
Soviet era, they remained empty.33
Unlike Rostom, many Kists were grateful for the influx of new Islamic
currents from Daghestan to the north. The new Islam had brought with it
greater peace and stability among the young generation, one mother
explained to me. Even the new minarets were regarded fondly by some
Fig. 5: Minaret in the neighbouring village of Birkiani.
33 On abandoned Georgian churches in Pankisi, see Paul Manning,
‘Materiality and Cosmology: Old Georgian Churches as Sacred, Sublime, and
Secular Objects’, Ethnos, 73/3 (2008): 327–60.
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Kists, though not by the majority. Rostom called them grey eyesores.
His nephew compared them to the walls protecting a holy city.
‘They are one proof that Pankisi is different from the rest of Georgia’,
Rostom’s nephew explained one evening after dinner. ‘Even though we
speak Georgian with you, and even though we attend Georgian schools,
so long as we have our own minarets, we won’t forget our identity.’
To a greater extent than their fellow Vainakh, the Chechens and
Ingush to the north, Kist attitudes towards religion are influenced, like
their ritual practices, by Georgian Orthodox Christianity. Only rarely
does this influence amount to wholesale assimilation to Christian norms.
More than any other village in Pankisi, Joqolo had approached most
closely to complete assimilation, particularly in the pre-Soviet period,
when the benefits of conversion to Christianity were greater than during
the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. St. Giorgi’s Church still stands in the
centre of the village (Fig. 6). It was built in 1866, soon after the first
Chechen migration into Pankisi, but now stands empty. One of
Georgia’s most active and prolific Kists, Mat’e Albut’ashvili (1863–
1953; Figs. 7, 8), served as a priest in St. Giorgi’s Church during the
decades that he penned his ambitious survey of the Pankisi landscape.
First published serially, Albut’ashvili’s essays on Pankisi were later
collected under a title—The Pankisi Gorge: A Historical-Ethnographic
and Geographical Description (Pankisis xeoba: istoriul-etnograpiuli da
geograpiuli aghtsera, 1898)—that may have been intended to evoke
comparison with the Geographical Description of Georgia (Sak’art’velos
istoriul-geograpiul aghtsera) by the Georgian Prince Vaxusti (d. 1772),
a text that monumentally placed Georgia on the map of world
Fig. 6: Contemporary photo of St. Giorgi Church in Joqolo (also pictured in
Fig. 1), a bathhouse during Soviet times.
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historiography. After Albut’ashvili’s death, St. Giorgi’s Church was
turned into a bathhouse (abano), a familiar Soviet gesture, laden with the
symbolism of sacrilege.34
Fig. 7: Mat’e Albut’ashvili, 1916.
34 A more famous example of the Soviet endeavour to desacralize the sacred is
the conversion of St. Isaac’s Cathedral in St Petersburg into the ‘Museum of
Religion and Atheism’ during the most oppressive years of Stalin’s rule
(1930–37).
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PUBLIC MOURNING
Having focused on the architecture of Pankisi worship through minarets
and churches, I now turn briefly to another aspect of Pankisi Islam which
conveys the emotive needs of Kists and Chechens, namely burial rituals,
headstones, and related practices for dealing with mortality. If minarets
teach us about the new developments in Pankisi religiosity over the
course of the past decade, burial practices reveal even more about
Fig. 8: Mat’e Albut’ashvili, 1940.
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vernacular Islam on its northern periphery. Just as the adh:n issued from
minarets raises tensions at the dinner table and between generations in
Pankisi, so do burial practices induce silence when the subject is raised in
public contexts. The burial rituals that have been in place for centuries
have recently come under challenge by the new generation of Muslims,
who regard practices such as inscribing the face of the deceased on his or
her headstone as shirk. And yet both the old and young generations agree
in setting aside separate rows in their cemeteries for commemorating the
shuhad: (sing. shahı¯d) who died in the recent Russo-Chechen wars.
Many graves in the old cemeteries of Joqolo and Omalo bear marks of
Christian influence: crosses etched on headstones, and carefully carved
images reproducing the deceased’s likeness. Such practices contrast with
the customs of Sunni Daghestani Muslims in the nearby village of Satslis
Xure in Khakheti in northeast Georgia. Similar gravestones may be
found in Baku’s S¸@hidl@r Xiyaban| (Gallery of Martyrs in the Nagorno–
Karabakh war), suggesting in this instance—although the practice of
including an image of the deceased on headstones is attested elsewhere in
the Muslim post-Soviet world—how, as locals explained to me, Pankisi
Kist custom amalgamates Azeri Shi6a practices with Georgian
Christianity. Another striking aspect of Pankisi’s Muslim cemeteries is
inclusion of the d<6: (prayer or farewell invocation) in Georgian rather
than Arabic script (Fig. 9).
The old-style headstones contrast strikingly with the new headstones
created to honour the young Chechens from Pankisi who died in the war.
Buried in the old cemetery in Duisi, a kilometre south of Joqolo, this
more traditional cemetery (Figs. 10 and 11) offers more room between
headstones and subordinates their organization to a different order. The
headstones are all in Arabic script, and, with the exception of a faintly
etched head, there are no anthropomorphic images to be seen. Some
headstones are more elaborate than others, but all are austere compared
to Joqolo’s headstones.
Most moving of all the headstones is one in the corner of Duisi’s
version of Baku’s S¸@hidl@r Xiyaban| (Gallery of Martyrs): two rows of
roughly twenty empty graves, each nameless headstone marking a young
Chechen who died in the recent war. At the end of the first row, one
headstone in particular arrests the gaze. It is pallid grey, with no
flourishes, and inscribed with only two words in Chechen: dik k1ant,
meaning good boy, a commonly recurring phrase in Chechen epic tales
(illi). This epithet is given, unusually, in Georgian script. A green
headband is wrapped around the top, green being the colour both of
martyrdom and of piety in Islam. Duisi’s row of martyrs evokes
comparison with the headstones on the martyrs’ graves in Khasav-Yurt, a
city formerly inhabited by Chechens, now part of Daghestan. Due to its
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location in the heart of the north Caucasus, Khasav-Yurt has had more
continuous contact with Islamic norms and rituals than Pankisi. This
difference is apparent in the comparatively more elaborate headstone
that marks the graves of fallen shuhad: in Khasav-Yurt (Fig. 14). In the
latter locale, each shahı¯d’s grave is topped by an elaborate green banner
and a crescent moon with a star.
The blurred boundaries Pankisi straddles between Islam and
Christianity, and which are reflected in their headstones as much as in
Fig. 9: Headstone of Kist woman, Joqolo’s new cemetery.
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the proximity of churches and minarets, do not disturb most Kists, even
though they identify as Muslim with near unanimity. Perhaps due in part
to their location on the Chechen–Georgian border, the Kists are adept at
managing multiple identities. Like the Chechens, their interest lies more
in self-preservation than in adhering to external standards of religiosity.
In this respect, Kist religiosity is a product of what Taylor has famously
Fig. 10: Duisi cemetery.
Fig. 11: Traditional Sunni headstone.
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Fig. 12: Gallery of Martyrs, Duisi cemetery.
Fig. 13: Shahı¯d’s headstone, Duisi cemetery.
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called a ‘secular age’ in which ‘being a citizen takes precedence over a
host of other poles of identity, such as family, class, gender, even (perhaps
especially) religion’.35 As one Kist explained: ‘Headstones and minarets
Fig. 14: Central cemetery, Khasav-Yurt, Daghestan.
35 Charles Taylor, ‘The Secular Imperative’ in Rajeev Bhargava (ed.),
Secularism and Its Critics (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 44. In
elaborating on this condition, Charles Taylor argues that the replacement of
religiosity by citizenship ‘may be promoted in a deliberate way, on the basis of an
express ideology, as in the case of French Republicanism. Or it may be fostered in
more indirect ways, as a consequence of the injunction to render other modes of
description—gender, race, religion, etc.—irrelevant in the operation of public
life’. While Russia’s policy in Chechnya is an example of the former mode,
Georgia’s influence in Pankisi exemplifies the latter.
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come and go. The styles change with every generation. But the Kists will
always be here. We don’t change ourselves as easily as we change our
religions.’
Kist women are more forthcoming than Kist men in describing their
ritual practices. Rostom’s wife Mzia told me about a wird (sect) of
Duisielians in whose gatherings she sometimes participated. Although
the dichotomy is not uniform across the Islamic world, Naqshbandiyya
orders in the Caucasus perform al-dhikr al-khafı¯ (silent recollection of
God), whereas the Q:diriyya orders to which most of Pankisi’s devout
Muslims among the older generations belong perform al-dhikr al-jahrı¯
(loud recollection of God). The Duisi wird is no exception; their only
distinctive quality is that they perform the dhikr al-jahrı¯ on their knees in
complete darkness. Mzia further informed me that the shaykh of the
Duisi wird is buried in the village of Karbala on Georgian territory, near
the Azeri border. As the village name suggests, Karbala is populated by
Shi6a Azeris. Kists who belong to this wird visit their shaykh’s grave
regularly. According to Mzia, their rituals draw heavily on Shi6a
practices. Although the followers of this wird do not consider themselves
Shi6a, perhaps, Rostom suggested as he joined our conversation, they are
Shi6a in origin. As we speculated more on the subject, Rostom’s interest
seemed to increase, until finally he interrupted:
‘Isn’t it strange how everyone believes the same thing yet they try to
present it as their own truth? All that separates the Duisi wird from the
Shi6a is a label. Why don’t they just call themselves Shi6a?’
Mzia added that there is a second wird in Pankisi, the E:jjı¯ wird. As
Mzia’s mother had belonged to the Shaykh wird, she was relatively
ignorant of E:jjı¯ wird rituals, and advised me to ask other elderly
women for more information. But no one in Omalo seemed to know
who the E:jjı¯—A:jjı¯ being a title conferred on any male who made the
pilgrimage to Makka—in question was. Concluding that she was better
informed about the original Pankisi Islam than anyone else in Omalo,
I returned to Mzia:
‘Was there actually someone who went on the Aajj from Pankisi?’ I
asked. ‘Is that why they call themselves E:jjı¯? Does anyone travel from
here to Makka?’
Mzia explained that the Aajj had been quite common in pre-Soviet
days, especially for men, but also for Kist women. It had been forbidden
during Soviet rule. Now, Kists were returning to old ways. Over ten of
Pankisi’s elderly generation had performed the Aajj in the past year.
According to some of Rostom’s cousins who had arrived in Pankisi
as refugees from Chechnya, a shrine still stood in Vedeno, high in
mountainous Chechnya where even Russian soldiers rarely travelled. The
mother of the founder of the E:jjı¯ wird was buried there. Her name was
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Patimat, a Georgianized form of F:3ima (lacking an equivalent for f:8 in
its alphabet, Georgian assimilates f to p). I mentioned that Vedeno, in
addition to being a base for Im:m Sh:mil’s imamate and the birthplace
of Sh:mil Basaev, was the burial place of the abrek (holy bandit)
Zelimkhan (d. 1913), who famously staged one of the final resistances to
Russian rule before the north Caucasus was incorporated into the Soviet
empire. 36 These connections suggested that the E:jjı¯ wird originally had
deeper ties to militant Naqshbandiyya Sufism than Q:diriyya quietism.
SOVIET SCEPTICISM
Rostom used Mzia’s description of religious practices in Pankisi as a
pretext for another parody of the ridiculous antics people stoop to for the
sake of their belief in God.
‘Just think of the silliness that fills the world,’ he said. ‘Think of all the
money wasted on building temples, when we could just as easily pray at
home. Those new Muslims try telling us that we have to pray in Arabic!
Does God only understand one language?’
But the real mocker of religion in Pankisi was not Rostom, whose
circumspect nature prevented him from crossing the bounds of respect
for what he couldn’t appreciate, but Suleiman Gumashvili, poet, scholar,
and heretic extraordinaire. Suleiman had lost his job in the Saakashvili
administration following the Rose Revolution (2003) for his anti-
Georgian and pro-Kist statements, and now he was intent on stirring
trouble at home.37
‘You know what the Bible is?’ Suleiman asked me once, after spending
two hours explaining how Christianity and Jesus Christ himself were
derived from the Vainakh people. ‘It is a collection of fairy tales and lies.
Some smart people centuries ago sat down to write a book to fool the
rest of the world. And they succeeded! Christianity is nothing more than
a myth.’
One evening, as I sat talking to Suleiman while he finished his third
shot of vodka, I asked if he considered himself Muslim. Given his
previous dismissive and deliberately provocative comments concerning
the Qur8:n, I expected him to say no. ‘Of course,’ he announced without
irony, as he downed the shot of vodka and poured another. ‘I may not
36 For a detailed account of the complex genealogy and legacy of Zelimkhan
and other abreks, see Rebecca Gould, ‘Transgressive Sanctity: The Abrek in
Chechen Culture’, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 8/2
(2007): 271–306, and the accompanying bibliography.
37 Suleiman’s work and beliefs are discussed in detail in Gould, ‘Language
Dreamers’.
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believe in all the Muslims say, I may not always pray at the right times,
but I am definitely Muslim.’ In laying claim to a Muslim identity that did
not require full assent to Islamic doctrines or participation in ritual
injunctions, Suleiman suggested that Khalid’s argument that ‘before the
Russian conquest . . . being Muslim meant [only] being part of a
community that saw itself as Muslim’ obtains today in certain circles,
long after the fall of the Soviet Union.38 Even more profoundly, it attests
to what we have called the secularity of post-Soviet Islam, whereby the
abstracted category of religion is taken to produce ‘certain particular and
predictable effects’, be they positive or negative.39 This characteristically
modern form of secularism identified by Casanova as one of the few
overdetermining features of our global condition does not presuppose an-
tagonism towards religion, as is sometimes assumed in Euro–American
contexts. It does however subordinate religious to cultural and political
ends even—perhaps especially—when it does so within an explicitly
Muslim framework.
Other self-identifying Muslims in Pankisi suggest just how much has
changed since the days when being Muslim was primarily a cultural and
even ethnic identity. When I conducted my interviews with Suleiman
during the day, his fourteen-year old son Zelimkhan sat in a corner,
curled over a book, whispering to himself quietly. At first the content of
Zelimkhan’s whispering was unclear. Unaccustomed to such practices
among the Kists, I suspected he was reciting a text in a foreign language.
One day, I entered unannounced, not knowing he was present in the
corner, silently reciting. Zelimkhan stopped his recitation. We sat
together in silence, awkwardly, until I moved to the other room. It did
not take long for me to realize that he was reciting the Qur8:n, though
this was the last thing one would expect from a son of Suleiman.
Zelimkhan’s sister Patima was less secretive about her brother’s religious
loyalties, perhaps because she did not interpret Suleiman’s criticisms of
Islam as personal affronts. When Zelimkhan’s elder brother visited
Joqolo a week later from Grozny, his character seemed to change
entirely. No longer was he the shy boy reciting the Qur8:n secretly. In the
presence of an elder brother who felt no need to be apologetic about his
religious identity, and who regarded his experience in war as proof of
his piety, Zelimkhan began to take on the characteristics of his brother.
His recitations of the Qur8:n suddenly increased in frequency, as did the
38 Khalid, Islam after Communism, 21.
39 Jose Casanova ‘The Secular and Secularisms’, Social Research 76/4 (2009):
1049–66, at 1052. Also see Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
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pitch of his tajwı¯d (recitation). Suleiman was not pleased by these
changes, but, as there was nothing he could do—or wished to do—to
stop his Zelimkhan from imbibing this new milieu, he took the new
influence which his eldest son exerted on his youngest son, as he did
everything else, in his stride, and made of his son’s newly emergent
character an archive for jokes.
‘My sons don’t like it when I drink’, Suleiman explained once his sons
were out of hearing range. ‘They tell me it’s written in the Qur8:n that
drinking is forbidden. No gambling or drinking—al-khamr wa-l-maysir,
they call it—in the house of Islam. I ask them: What is the Qur8:n but a
collection of fairy tales? They don’t like my answer, and so we fight all
the time.’
Suleiman’s exposure to the ambiguities of religious life in a society that
officially mandated atheism among the educated classes enabled what
from other perspectives would seem like a contradiction: Suleiman called
himself Muslim, especially when faced with an alien Christian creed, and
when asked to define himself to the outside world. But when ensconced
in his own home, in Pankisi, he became the inverse of his public identity.
By his sons, and to a lesser extent by his neighbours, Suleiman was
regarded as a heretic and practitioner of shirk. In response, he denied the
validity of pillars of the Islamic faith including the Qur8:n—hardly a
common response for the pious Muslim he insisted on being in Georgian
contexts.
One day, Suleiman took me on a tour of Joqolo. We passed St. Giorgi’s
church, one of the village’s central landmarks, once flourishing but now
solemnly standing empty, a remnant of religious practices that had been
overcome. When we reached the town centre, we approached a group of
men leaning against the dilapidated central office (called in Georgian
sabcho), the closest thing Joqolo had to a city hall.
‘Meet the two mullahs of Joqolo,’ Suleiman said in his customarily
mocking tone. ‘One is Wahhabi—’ he paused and pointed to a young
man in running pants with rolled up cuffs and dirty tennis shoes—‘the
other is Harabi.’ He pointed to an elderly man in the traditional
accoutrement of the north Caucasian highlander, papakh (a tall hat made
of wool) and chokha (a thick cape made of animal skin).
The men entered into a debate regarding which language to speak in
the presence of a foreigner: Kist (Chechen) or Georgian. This led to my
questions concerning the extent of their knowledge of Arabic. It turned
out that Suleiman the apostate knew Arabic best of all, or at least he was
the only one willing to cite the ‘Our Father’ prayer from the Christian
Bible in Arabic. After Suleiman finished reciting the prayer in Arabic, he
turned to the ‘Wahhabi’ mullah and asked him to start praying in Arabic
for my sake.
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Suleiman pointed to my camera and said I would capture it on film,
that I had come all the way from America just to see him ‘perform’ the
prayer. Vakha did not seem perturbed by Suleiman’s blasphemy. I
separated myself from the crowd and glanced in the direction of
Suleiman’s home, indicating that it was time to end these mockeries and
go home. But Suleiman would not give up.
‘Why won’t you perform for her? She really wants to see a Chechen
Wahhabi say a prayer in Arabic. Get down on your knees, man!’ Though
Suleiman spoke Georgian for my benefit, Vakha, annoyed by Suleiman’s
antics, reproached him in Kist.
Both Rostom and Suleiman enjoyed mocking religious pieties. Their
religious scepticism marked both as Soviet-educated intelligents. For
both intellectuals, religion seemed a farce, a stage on which the follies of
the world played out. Their resistance to Islam was no less a performance
than were the prayers to which I awoke every morning during my field
work in Omalo. Their secularity was less anti-religious than the product
of a new modern configuration of things, what Casanova calls ‘an
epistemic knowledge regime that may be [. . .] phenomenologically
assumed as the taken-for-granted normal structure of modern reality, as a
modern doxa, or as an ‘‘unthought’’.’40 As a Georgian friend once
explained to me, anyone whose mind was formed during the Soviet era
learned to ignore the first and last section of any book, because it was on
these pages that the ideological content was most intense and where the
most concessions were made to Soviet dictums. Only the sections
between the beginning and the end, the sections that censors were too
busy to inspect, were worth reading. This is how form became a matter
of content and content became a matter of form under the Soviet regime.
This hermeneutic principle may help us to understand the relation
between form and content in the study of Islam in post-Soviet spaces.
The common vocabulary through which Rostom and Suleiman
articulated their critique of the newly emergent faith of Pankisi Islam
has been noted. For a textual exemplification of their arguments, we may
turn to a foundational text in the Soviet historiography of Chechen
Sufism, Iandarbek Iandarov’s Sufism and the Ideology of National
Liberation (1975).41 While this text was the first scholarly work to
40 Casanova, ‘Secular and Secularisms’, 1051.
41 Iandarbek Iandarov, Sufizm i ideologiia natsional’no-osvoboditel’nogo
dvizheniia: iz istorii razvitiia obshchestvennykh idei v Checheno-Ingushetii v
20-70-e gody XIX v. (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1975). Iandarov’s text is also important
in Chechen historiography as it was one of the very few scholarly studies
produced by a Chechen after Stalin’s brutal deportation of the Chechens and
many other Muslim peoples to Central Asia. That the work was published in
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examine with a relatively open mind the impact of Islam on north
Caucasian anti-colonial movements, when the author undertakes to
analyse the relationship between Im:m Sh:mil’s murı¯d movement and
the Naqshbandiyya Sufism which inspired it, the political conditions
under which the secularized Vainakh intellectual laboured in Soviet times
are exposed in all their strengths and limitations.
The book’s subtitle points to its specific focus within the broader
project of exploring Sufism’s political implications: Towards a history of
the political in Chechnya and Ingushetia from the 1820s to the 1870s.42
This time span—the 1820s to the 1870s—frames the era of anti-colonial
resistance to Russian conquests.43 Quotations from the early Marx are
skilfully deployed to demonstrate a thesis that stands in striking tension
with the author’s own nuanced examinations of Sufism. For Iandarov,
religion is a ‘cover’—the term he uses is oblochka, meaning form, model,
shell, or pretext—for social and political grabs for power. Iandarov’s
thesis of religion-as-form owes a deep, unwitting, debt to Christian
theodicy, specifically to the pietistic version of it inherited by Marx. Far
from being neatly opposed to religion, even the Soviet discourse on the
sacred did not manage to suppress the problem of belief entirely.
At one level, Iandarov echoes the Soviet-enforced idealization of
worlds without religion. At the same time, and in contradiction to the
first premise, in arguing against one kind of Sufism, Iandarov’s text
argues for another. And while the contemporary reader is struck by the
Soviet imprint of his thesis, more striking on closer inspection is the
author’s subversion of Soviet norms. Sufism and the Ideology of National
Liberation provides a code for reading national liberation into taBawwuf.
Iandarov’s hermeneutic strategy reproduces Soviet conflations of nation,
ideology, language and religion, but his method exceeds these reductions.
Under the guise of Marxist-Leninism, Iandarov critiques Tsarist
sources for reducing religion to fanaticism. ‘All official organs of the
Tsarist era’, he writes only a few years before Said’s Orientalism (1978)
made a related point in a different language and under radically different
Alma Ata, the capital of Kazhakhstan, where Iandarov had been deported, is
highly significant.
42 Many plausible translations for ‘obshchestvennykh idei’ could be proposed,
including ‘social ideas’ and ‘political ideas’. I have preferred to collapse the
singular/plural distinction and simply translate the phrase by ‘the political’.
43 There was no such political entity as ‘Chechnya-Ingushetia’ during the
nineteenth century. This is a Soviet invention (the Republic of Checheno-
Ingushetia was created in 1938, destroyed in 1944, and brought back to life in
1957, only to be destroyed again with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991), so
Iandarov’s subtitle is anachronistic.
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political circumstances, ‘represented the mountaineers as fanatics, and
even their courage and the incredible sacrifices they displayed in their
struggle for freedom, was explained only by fanaticism’.44 The
Chechen-Soviet scholar uses the normative cliche´s of Soviet ideology as
an obolochka within which to pursue a contrarian agenda, ultimately
incompatible with the norms of the system within which he was writing.
Soviet ideology made available to Iandarov a position from which to
critique Tsarist colonialism. This subversive element in his writing is
more significant than the formal concessions his texts make to Soviet
ideology.
Iandarov’s officially anti-religious, pro-Soviet stance did not prevent
him from offering his own phenomenology of taBawwuf. ‘Sufism,’ he
wrote, ‘like religion in general, can only be born in a society in which,
to use the words of Karl Marx, a person is intensely aware of the
‘‘uncertainty [samorazorvannost’] of earthly existence.’’ In Sufism the
fleetingness [neustroiennost’] of the world is expressed, as is the hostility
of social institutions to human nature, and the impossibility of recreating
the world [pereustroistva mira]. Such is the foundation for Sufism’s
advocacy of making peace with the world that exists, as well as its belief
in the fleetingness of the world’.45 Iandarov’s rejection of pereustroistva
mira, the task of recreating the world, flies directly in the face of Marxian
precepts on the role of agency in history. When Soviet writers applied
Marx mechanically, as they were often constrained to do, they often
omitted the second premises of Marx’s arguments. Thus the famous line
from The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (1852) ‘Men make
their own history [ihre eigene Geschichte], but they do not make it just as
they please [aus freien Stu¨cken]; they do not make it under circumstances
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered,
given and transmitted from the past [u¨berlieferten Umsta¨nden]’46 was
reduced to an argument for the autonomy of the acting subject in history,
as was the even more famous cliche´ concerning religion as the opium of
the people. Soviet scholars omitted that Marx had preceded his dismissal
of religion with a more ambivalent claim, calling religion: ‘the sigh of the
oppressed [der Seufzer der bedra¨ngten Kreatur], the heart of a heartless
world [Gemu¨t einer herzlosen Welt], and the soul of soulless conditions
[der Geist geistloser Zusta¨nde]’.47 In the aftermath of the Soviet
44 Iandarov, Sufizm i ideologiia, 160.
45 Ibid, 46.
46 Marx/Engels-Werke (Berlin: Dietz, 1971), viii. 115.
47 Ibid, i. 378. Michel Foucault also criticized the Marxist left of his milieu for
misunderstanding and misquoting Marx’s critique of religion. See his Politics,
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experiment, these words hardly read as an injunction to banish religion
from modern life.
By subverting one kind of Marxist-Leninist reading practice, Iandarov
accessed another hermeneutic, derived from a Marx better known to
Western theorists but hardly known at all, and in a fundamental sense,
unknowable to the Soviet-educated intelligentsia. This was a Marx
Iandarov perhaps had never read, and whom he certainly never learned
about in school, but who nonetheless helped him to understand the
peculiar persistence of Islam in the modern world. Sandwiched between
the official disavowals of religion at the beginning and end of Iandarov’s
book is a cogent and sympathetic analysis of Sufism’s philosophic
origins. Marx’s canonical voice sanctions a passage that would otherwise
seem anti-Soviet and therefore a dangerous liability for the author.
TaBawwuf in Iandarov’s work represents the negation of the Soviet
doctrine of the inevitable progress of human history.
SECULARITY AS THE GENERATOR OF
RELIGION
Now that we have examined conceptual barriers erected by Christian,
and following that, Soviet, paradigms, to belief, it remains to make sense
of religion’s persuasive power in the desacralized spaces of Pankisi’s
shrines, cemeteries, mosques, and abandoned churches. Surely these new
Islamic currents do not represent the last gasp of a dying faith. More is at
stake in the controversies over minarets in Pankisi and Switzerland, over
headscarves in France, and even over cartoons in Denmark. Casanova
registers this point well when, in reflecting on the secular condition, he
notes that the fact that the ‘modernization of so many non-Western
societies is accompanied by processes of religious revival should put into
question the premise that the decline of religious beliefs and practices is a
quasi-natural consequence of processes of modernization’.48 The most
peculiar point that emerges from the ethnography adduced above is that
the religious revival that has in part been documented here is not merely
compatible with the persistence of the secular but is in fact its direct
consequence. More visibly in Pankisi than elsewhere in the world,
secularity produces religion, and does not simply or solely negate it.
Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977–1984 (ed. Lawrence
D. Kritzman and Alan Sheridan; New York: Routledge, 1988), 218.
48 Casanova, ‘Secular and Secularisms’, 1053.
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In his critique of the secular, Gil Anidjar has written that ‘Islam is to
Europe . . . [what] religion is to secularism’.49 On Anidjar’s reading,
Islam’s failing from the point of the view of the Euro–American
mainstream, is that unlike Christianity, it has failed to ‘secularize itself’.
Orientalism in this elaboration has historically served as the handmaiden
of this division. ‘Orientalism—that is to say, secularism—’, writes
Anidjar, ‘became one of the essential means by which Christianity failed
to criticize itself, the means by which Christianity forgot and forgave
itself’.50 In a different through related vein, Marcel Gauchet has captured
the uniqueness of the Christian dispensation in world history by
characterizing it as ‘a religion for departing from religion.’51 An even
fuller articulation of Christianity’s specific contribution to the secular is
proposed by Casanova, who argues that the secular first emerged as a
Christian theological category ‘that not only served to organize the
particular social formation of Western Christendom, but structured
thereafter the very dynamics of how to transform or free oneself from
such a system’.52 The combined insights of Casanova, Gauchet, and
Anidjar tell us that in creating the secular, Christianity inaugurated the
end of religion.
And yet, as Casanova would be the first to point out, our conception of
the potential forms taken by the secular should not be wholly
circumscribed by the Christian tradition, no matter how crucial this
tradition may be to making sense of our global modernity. A strong case
can be made that Islam, precisely in its capacity as a religion, can
contribute to a deeper and more wide-reaching understanding of the
relations between the sacred and the profane, the transcendent and the
immanent, and the secular and the religious.53 Casanova is right to point
out that, notwithstanding their seeming parallelism, the binaries that
structure secular and non-secular relations do not coincide, and every
tradition has a different perspective to add. In Pankisi, where the adh:n
is welcomed in a landscape that has yet to shed its Soviet inheritance,
secularity has contributed to the flourishing of religion. The coexistence
of these supposed antinomies—secularism and religion—suggests the
fallacious logic that motivates certain reductionist applications of the
secular premise. Secularism has not succeeded in killing the gods though
in many cases it has lost the ability to cope with them.
49 Gil Anidjar, ‘Secularism’, 75.
50 Ibid, 63.
51 Marcel Gauchet, The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of
Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 4.
52 Casanova, ‘Secular and Secularisms’, 1063.
53 Ibid.
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If we distinguish between secularism as ideology—the doctrine that
consciously opposes itself to religion and which presents this opposition
as the only intellectual valid option—and secularism as statecraft—
which makes provision for the free exercise of religion and the free
exercise of church and state—then the argument can and has been made
that Islam actively propagates the secular through its political arrange-
ments, albeit in radically different fashion from the Christian dispensa-
tion.54 Far from being a paradox, the persistence of Islam in Pankisi
would appear to be the logical outcome of nearly a century of secular
rule. In making possible ‘a less Eurocentric comparative analysis of
patterns of differentiation and secularization’,55 and thereby learning to
conceive the secular in ways we have not been taught to do before, an
anthropology of Islam will help us understand the religious structure that
informs the secular even as we come to grips with the secular content of
modern religion.
54 For example, Abdullah Ahmed an-Na6im argues that a truly Islamic state
can only be a secular state, and that Shar6ı¯a is incompatible with theocracy. See
his Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari6a (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2008).
55 Casanova, ‘Secular and Secularisms’, 1050.
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